Post by Joga on Dec 11, 2005 15:45:10 GMT -6
www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1134323377121060.xml
Politics delayed troops dispatch to N.O.
Blanco resisted Bush leadership proposal
Sunday, December 11, 2005
By Robert Travis Scott
Capital bureau
BATON ROUGE -- The 82nd Airborne is "trained to deploy anywhere, at any time, to fight upon arrival and to win," according to the mission statement of the famous Army division based at Fort Bragg, N.C.
It's a force capable of launching a strategic mission into any area of the world with 18 hours of notification, so the question for many people is why it took President Bush five days to order the 82nd on the ground to deal with the lawlessness and human suffering that spread across New Orleans right after Hurricane Katrina.
Advertisement
The implications are politically charged. Was Gov. Kathleen Blanco too flustered and overwhelmed by the situation to communicate effectively with President Bush? Or was the White House more focused on political maneuvering than helping the citizens of New Orleans?
Blanco will face the controversy on a national stage Wednesday when she testifies before a congressional committee investigating the government's preparation and response to Katrina. Her appearance is preceded by her administration's recent release of thousands of documents, including e-mail messages, reports and hand-scribbled notes, that were requested by House and Senate panels.
In her 16-page overview of those documents, no topicconsumes the governor more than the policy decision of bringing federal troops such as the 82nd Airborne into New Orleans to supplement National Guard units.
The documents show that the White House delayed its decision to deploy federal troops while it pressured the nation's senior National Guard official to persuade Blanco to accept the president's hand-picked commander to run the entire response effort.
The records also reveal a Democratic administration in Baton Rouge seized with anxiety that the media, swayed by a Republican spin machine, would make it appear that the relief effort would improve overnight if the president took control, and that Blanco was dragging her feet to invite federal help.
"The (White House) spin is that this (is) state and local fault," Blanco Chief of Staff Andy Kopplin e-mailed to Blanco's top aides on Sept. 4.
Any paranoia that Blanco officials might have had about a GOP agenda was fed by phone calls and e-mail messages from national media and other sources. For example, an ABC News reporter wrote Blanco's press secretary, "2 senior GOP aides have called me to suggest we should be focusing more blame on Governor Blanco." A New York Times reporter wrote an e-mail message saying, "Several officials in Washington are asserting that the Federal Government should have assumed control of the overall operation . . . As it would have meant, they suggested, better coordination of the response."
An e-mail message between Blanco aides said a prominent New Orleans banker "called . . . this morning and has it on very good authority that (White House strategist) Karl Rove is directing effort to put blame on kbb (governor) for mess saying that the reason feds not on ground sooner was that she refused to give up her authority."
Guard poised to act
Most of Louisiana's National Guard forces were on duty in Iraq and Afghanistan in late August. But nearly all of the remaining 5,700 National Guard members from Louisiana were in place and ready to respond when the storm hit Aug. 29.
Four times that number from other states arrived during the week in the largest coordinated multistate mobilization of guardsmen in the nation's history. Some states sent their Guard units even before the legal paperwork had been completed to officially release them.
All Guard forces remained under the control of Blanco through her chosen adjutant general, Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau.
During the first days, Coast Guard, Army, Navy and Air Force units contributed much to the rescue and supply missions, but no regular Army ground troops were sent until Sept. 3. On that day, President Bush signed an order giving the Army's 82nd Airborne and 1st Cavalry divisions and Marine units 72 hours to deploy in southeast Louisiana.
The federal troops arrived in substantial numbers Sept. 5, a week after the storm, all under the control of Lt. Gen. Russel Honore, a Lakeland native who commands Joint Task Force Katrina, the federal forces responding in three states.
In the end, Landreneau and Honore held a joint command, which basically meant they kept control of their respective forces and coordinated their efforts.
Normally, when a state faces a disaster, it first turns to its National Guard, which can conduct relief and law enforcement actions. The president can contribute forces through the Department of Defense, and he may "federalize" an entire response operation and put his own commander in charge of both federal and state National Guard units.
Generally, the law prohibits federal military forces from acting as police on American soil, even during a disaster. If federalized, guardsmen in most circumstances also would be prohibited from conducting law enforcement.
Documents and interviews show that Blanco wanted to avoid conceding her authority, and during the week she argued that a federalization of all military units would compromise her ability to keep law and order.
The White House has made minimal comment about what Bush officials were thinking that week, but the goal was to name a single commander.
"We were actively trying to find a solution with state officials to bring federal troops as quickly as possible and under a single chain of command," said Jeanie Mamo, White House spokeswoman.
A vague pronouncement?
On the day Katrina hit, Blanco told the president by phone, "We need everything you've got," according to the governor's overview. She has not contended that she said anything more specific, and her staff cannot point to any documents demonstrating she requested federal troop deployments that day.
A Bush administration official said Blanco did not ask for federal troops on Aug. 29.
Blanco spokeswoman Denise Bottcher said the need was obvious from the start, and that federal officials including FEMA chief Michael Brown were with the governor and knew the extent of the catastrophe, and simply failed to communicate that up the ladder.
On Aug. 30, Blanco made two trips to the Superdome, which had become an understaffed and poorly supplied evacuation center with no power or running water. Even though the Dome was surrounded by floodwaters, the refugee population was still growing. Meanwhile, thousands of people in St. Bernard and the Lower 9th Ward sought high ground on levees or rooftops. With National Guard units focused on urgent search, rescue and law enforcement action, Blanco said she asked Landreneau to request federal troops to help with evacuations.
In an interview last week, Landreneau said he spoke that evening with Honore. He said he specifically requested a division of federal ground forces, in particular to evacuate stranded people from the city. He said he also called Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau, to ask for help in getting Guard troops from other states.
Asked whether the response would have been more effective if federal troops had arrived more quickly, Landreneau said, "We would like to have seen that a little quicker, too. I can't respond to your question about why they didn't come any sooner."
Honore did not respond to interview requests.
More delays
On the morning of Aug. 31, Blanco was awaiting a television interview when she whispered a comment to Bottcher, saying she should have requested troops earlier. The comment was picked up off-air and cited as an admission by Blanco that she was tardy in her request for ground troops.
Bottcher said the comment was taken out of context.
That same day, Honore showed up at the state's emergency command center in Baton Rouge with only a small support staff, stumping Blanco, who assumed he was coming with a load of federal troops, according to the governor's overview.
"The evacuation must be conducted by National Guard troops, as the federal contingent has not arrived," the overview says.
That afternoon, another ingredient was added to the political mix of the federal troops issue. At the state command center, Sen. David Vitter, R-La., told Blanco's executive counsel, Terry Ryder, that he had spoken by phone with White House strategist Karl Rove about the potential troop deployments and whether the Bush administration should federalize the storm response.
Vitter recently said he was not a go-between offering a deal to Blanco, and several governor's aides last week also said they did not consider the senator a liaison from the White House. But the mention of Rove, a shrewd and aggressive molder of public opinion, was a red flag. Blanco aides feared his involvement meant the federalization issue had become a political flash point, as internal memos indicated that week. At one point a memo from Kopplin said, "Rove is on the prowl."
In a recent interview, Vitter said he saw the urgent need for the "double spigot" of federal as well as Guard troops and that the arguments over command structure were "academic," given the human suffering taking place.
He said he found fault with both sides, with Blanco sending unclear messages about what she wanted and Bush being overly sensitive about overstepping the governor's authority.
"I was very frustrated," Vitter said. The dispute over authority "clearly was holding this up."
In reaction to Vitter's message, Blanco called Bush at 2:20 p.m. to say she wanted a federal troop mobilization "today" and asked that someone communicate to her when the soldiers would arrive, according to Ryder's notes as he listened to the conversation. The governor specifically said she was not requesting federalization. There are no notes indicating Bush's response.
Suspicious of White House
Meanwhile, the White House, Pentagon and Department of Justice were weighing the legal options for various methods of placing federal troops in Louisiana. A senior Justice official said the agency provided legal consultation on federalizing the relief and law enforcement efforts late in the week.
On Sept. 1, three days after Katrina, U.S. District Attorney Jim Letten appeared at the state command center and spoke with Bottcher. While on the phone with the U.S. attorney general's office, Letten asked Bottcher for specifics about the troop deployments the governor wanted, Bottcher later said. Blanco officials interpreted this as further evidence the White House was bent on federalizing the relief operation.
Letten would not comment for this report.
Well into the evening, Ryder and other Blanco officials talked to military brass about the consequences of federalizing, with most officers advising the governor to maintain control over her Guard troops.
Among the most important recommendations was the one by Blum, the National Guard Bureau chief, who said the governor had nothing to gain by federalizing her Guard, according to Ryder's notes. Besides, massive numbers of Guard units now were flowing in quickly from other states, Blum pointed out.
By this time, Blanco officials and political strategists were conversing about the potential public relations consequences of the delayed federal response.
"By the weekend, the Bush administration will have a full-blown PR disaster/scandal on their hands because of the late response to needs in New Orleans," according to a Sept. 1 e-mail message sent by Blanco communications director Bob Mann. He attributed the observation to former President Clinton's press secretary Mike McCurry.
Kopplin advised the Blanco staff by e-mail that "we need to keep working to get our national surrogates to explain the facts." The chief of staff for Virginia's Democratic Gov. Mark Warner sent Kopplin an e-mail message with arguments and talking points against Guard federalization. And the communications director for the Democratic Governors Association sought to rally sympathetic governors with the message, "The states will help Louisiana, but where is the federal government?"
A furious Nagin
The morning of Sept. 2, Bush met with Blanco in New Orleans aboard Air Force One, and to some in attendance it appeared the denouement of the federal troops story had finally come. Instead, the meeting produced more controversy and no immediate decision.
Among those present were New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, both Louisiana senators, two congressmen, military officers and Bush Chief of Staff Andy Card.
Vitter and Nagin pressed for resolution on the troop deployments. At the mayor's urging, the president and governor moved to another section of the plane and talked privately for about a half hour, with Card present, according to interviews and reports from people there.
After the session with Blanco, the president invited Nagin into his office and told the mayor that he was "ready to move today" on the troop deployments and had offered two command options to Blanco, Nagin said. The mayor did not identify the options. However, the president said Blanco wanted 24 hours to make a decision, according to Nagin, who later roasted the governor in national TV interviews for the delay.
"It would have been great if we could have left Air Force One, walked outside, and told the world that we had this all worked out," Nagin told an interviewer. "It didn't happen, and more people died."
Some Blanco officials saw the Nagin critique as a veiled attack by the president.
"What have we done to counter Bush claim that gov delayed relief because she needed 24 hrs to make some decision?" reads an internal e-mail message by a Blanco administration official.
The governor's overview says that during the Air Force One meeting, the president asked Blanco to put her Guard troops under control of a general appointed by the Department of Defense, presumably Honore. In response, although she made the case to keep her adjutant general in charge, she didn't say no.
"Out of respect for the President, Gov. Blanco agrees that she would talk to Gen. Landreneau and her executive counsel and review the President's reorganization proposal," the overview says.
Blanco's internal documents would later call Bush's proposal a "paper reorganization." Still, according to Blanco's overview, she left Air Force One under the impression that Bush's anticipated order for federal troops in no way depended on the chain of command structure.
If she truly believed that, then it is no wonder her staff was so surprised by what happened around midnight.
'Rove is on the prowl'
More than any other event that week, the "midnight memo" dramatically elevated the Blanco team's sense of a political assault from Washington.
Drafted by the White House, a letter prepared for the governor's signature came across the fax machine at the state's Emergency Operations Center at 11:20 p.m. on Sept. 2, four and a half days after Katrina struck New Orleans.
At that time, the governor was awakened by calls from Card and Blum to discuss a new proposal. Her top staff spent the night poring over an attached draft memorandum of understanding, also prepared by the White House, that would have triggered the long-awaited deployment of regular Army troops to the region.
But Blanco aides were deeply suspicious.
"Please call my cell asap. Rove is on the prowl," Kopplin warns Mann in a 3:45 a.m. e-mail.
The agreement would have let President Bush place Honore over the entire hurricane response operation, including National Guard units in Louisiana overseen by the governor. But the offer had a twist: Honore would take a dual-hat command, meaning he would answer to Bush on matters related to the federal troops while answering to Blanco on matters related to the Guard.
If the commander encountered a conflict in orders between his two superiors, he would defer to his "federal mission" the president -- while judges deliberated over which order to follow.
"Mr. President, these actions are essential to ensure unity of effort and a fully coordinated state and Federal response to this extraordinary disaster," stated the draft letter.
Blanco aides were clearly alarmed that Blum had called to endorse the idea, because it seemed that after a visit to the White House he had changed his mind from earlier in the week.
In Ryder's notes from a phone call with Blum the next day, the National Guard chief told Ryder he was "under political duress" to endorse the midnight memo and was sorry about the late-night call.
"I apologize for an absolute goat screwing," Blum said, according to Ryder's notes.
A National Guard spokesman said Blum would not be available for comment until later this week.
Death amid inaction
Blanco's top aides said the memo was unexpected and unwanted, and the governor refused to sign it. Though the situation in New Orleans remained grim, crime and the evacuations had come under control, and the crisis had turned a corner. A Bush takeover at that point could have played a huge political trump card for the president.
The morning of Sept. 3, Blanco faxed back a letter of her own to the White House, making an innocuous point that it was OK with her if Bush put Honore in charge of federal forces, which was already the case.
At 8:56 a.m., Blanco called the White House and reached Card, who said the president was headed to the Rose Garden to announce the federal troop deployments. Under Bush's order that morning, Blanco and Landreneau would keep authority over the Guard, and the president and Honore would rule federal forces in the region.
It was the same point they had started with when Landreneau had called Honore four days earlier asking for help.
But by this time, many people had died, or had lived through frightful and inhumane conditions waiting to be rescued or bused out. By the end of the day, the Superdome and convention center would be evacuated.
By Monday, with nearly 20,000 National Guard members already in place, about 1,800 troops with the 82nd Airborne Division arrived in New Orleans. The Army eventually sent about 7,000. They were heartily welcomed and for several weeks until they left, they served an important role in the relief effort.
Politics delayed troops dispatch to N.O.
Blanco resisted Bush leadership proposal
Sunday, December 11, 2005
By Robert Travis Scott
Capital bureau
BATON ROUGE -- The 82nd Airborne is "trained to deploy anywhere, at any time, to fight upon arrival and to win," according to the mission statement of the famous Army division based at Fort Bragg, N.C.
It's a force capable of launching a strategic mission into any area of the world with 18 hours of notification, so the question for many people is why it took President Bush five days to order the 82nd on the ground to deal with the lawlessness and human suffering that spread across New Orleans right after Hurricane Katrina.
Advertisement
The implications are politically charged. Was Gov. Kathleen Blanco too flustered and overwhelmed by the situation to communicate effectively with President Bush? Or was the White House more focused on political maneuvering than helping the citizens of New Orleans?
Blanco will face the controversy on a national stage Wednesday when she testifies before a congressional committee investigating the government's preparation and response to Katrina. Her appearance is preceded by her administration's recent release of thousands of documents, including e-mail messages, reports and hand-scribbled notes, that were requested by House and Senate panels.
In her 16-page overview of those documents, no topicconsumes the governor more than the policy decision of bringing federal troops such as the 82nd Airborne into New Orleans to supplement National Guard units.
The documents show that the White House delayed its decision to deploy federal troops while it pressured the nation's senior National Guard official to persuade Blanco to accept the president's hand-picked commander to run the entire response effort.
The records also reveal a Democratic administration in Baton Rouge seized with anxiety that the media, swayed by a Republican spin machine, would make it appear that the relief effort would improve overnight if the president took control, and that Blanco was dragging her feet to invite federal help.
"The (White House) spin is that this (is) state and local fault," Blanco Chief of Staff Andy Kopplin e-mailed to Blanco's top aides on Sept. 4.
Any paranoia that Blanco officials might have had about a GOP agenda was fed by phone calls and e-mail messages from national media and other sources. For example, an ABC News reporter wrote Blanco's press secretary, "2 senior GOP aides have called me to suggest we should be focusing more blame on Governor Blanco." A New York Times reporter wrote an e-mail message saying, "Several officials in Washington are asserting that the Federal Government should have assumed control of the overall operation . . . As it would have meant, they suggested, better coordination of the response."
An e-mail message between Blanco aides said a prominent New Orleans banker "called . . . this morning and has it on very good authority that (White House strategist) Karl Rove is directing effort to put blame on kbb (governor) for mess saying that the reason feds not on ground sooner was that she refused to give up her authority."
Guard poised to act
Most of Louisiana's National Guard forces were on duty in Iraq and Afghanistan in late August. But nearly all of the remaining 5,700 National Guard members from Louisiana were in place and ready to respond when the storm hit Aug. 29.
Four times that number from other states arrived during the week in the largest coordinated multistate mobilization of guardsmen in the nation's history. Some states sent their Guard units even before the legal paperwork had been completed to officially release them.
All Guard forces remained under the control of Blanco through her chosen adjutant general, Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau.
During the first days, Coast Guard, Army, Navy and Air Force units contributed much to the rescue and supply missions, but no regular Army ground troops were sent until Sept. 3. On that day, President Bush signed an order giving the Army's 82nd Airborne and 1st Cavalry divisions and Marine units 72 hours to deploy in southeast Louisiana.
The federal troops arrived in substantial numbers Sept. 5, a week after the storm, all under the control of Lt. Gen. Russel Honore, a Lakeland native who commands Joint Task Force Katrina, the federal forces responding in three states.
In the end, Landreneau and Honore held a joint command, which basically meant they kept control of their respective forces and coordinated their efforts.
Normally, when a state faces a disaster, it first turns to its National Guard, which can conduct relief and law enforcement actions. The president can contribute forces through the Department of Defense, and he may "federalize" an entire response operation and put his own commander in charge of both federal and state National Guard units.
Generally, the law prohibits federal military forces from acting as police on American soil, even during a disaster. If federalized, guardsmen in most circumstances also would be prohibited from conducting law enforcement.
Documents and interviews show that Blanco wanted to avoid conceding her authority, and during the week she argued that a federalization of all military units would compromise her ability to keep law and order.
The White House has made minimal comment about what Bush officials were thinking that week, but the goal was to name a single commander.
"We were actively trying to find a solution with state officials to bring federal troops as quickly as possible and under a single chain of command," said Jeanie Mamo, White House spokeswoman.
A vague pronouncement?
On the day Katrina hit, Blanco told the president by phone, "We need everything you've got," according to the governor's overview. She has not contended that she said anything more specific, and her staff cannot point to any documents demonstrating she requested federal troop deployments that day.
A Bush administration official said Blanco did not ask for federal troops on Aug. 29.
Blanco spokeswoman Denise Bottcher said the need was obvious from the start, and that federal officials including FEMA chief Michael Brown were with the governor and knew the extent of the catastrophe, and simply failed to communicate that up the ladder.
On Aug. 30, Blanco made two trips to the Superdome, which had become an understaffed and poorly supplied evacuation center with no power or running water. Even though the Dome was surrounded by floodwaters, the refugee population was still growing. Meanwhile, thousands of people in St. Bernard and the Lower 9th Ward sought high ground on levees or rooftops. With National Guard units focused on urgent search, rescue and law enforcement action, Blanco said she asked Landreneau to request federal troops to help with evacuations.
In an interview last week, Landreneau said he spoke that evening with Honore. He said he specifically requested a division of federal ground forces, in particular to evacuate stranded people from the city. He said he also called Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau, to ask for help in getting Guard troops from other states.
Asked whether the response would have been more effective if federal troops had arrived more quickly, Landreneau said, "We would like to have seen that a little quicker, too. I can't respond to your question about why they didn't come any sooner."
Honore did not respond to interview requests.
More delays
On the morning of Aug. 31, Blanco was awaiting a television interview when she whispered a comment to Bottcher, saying she should have requested troops earlier. The comment was picked up off-air and cited as an admission by Blanco that she was tardy in her request for ground troops.
Bottcher said the comment was taken out of context.
That same day, Honore showed up at the state's emergency command center in Baton Rouge with only a small support staff, stumping Blanco, who assumed he was coming with a load of federal troops, according to the governor's overview.
"The evacuation must be conducted by National Guard troops, as the federal contingent has not arrived," the overview says.
That afternoon, another ingredient was added to the political mix of the federal troops issue. At the state command center, Sen. David Vitter, R-La., told Blanco's executive counsel, Terry Ryder, that he had spoken by phone with White House strategist Karl Rove about the potential troop deployments and whether the Bush administration should federalize the storm response.
Vitter recently said he was not a go-between offering a deal to Blanco, and several governor's aides last week also said they did not consider the senator a liaison from the White House. But the mention of Rove, a shrewd and aggressive molder of public opinion, was a red flag. Blanco aides feared his involvement meant the federalization issue had become a political flash point, as internal memos indicated that week. At one point a memo from Kopplin said, "Rove is on the prowl."
In a recent interview, Vitter said he saw the urgent need for the "double spigot" of federal as well as Guard troops and that the arguments over command structure were "academic," given the human suffering taking place.
He said he found fault with both sides, with Blanco sending unclear messages about what she wanted and Bush being overly sensitive about overstepping the governor's authority.
"I was very frustrated," Vitter said. The dispute over authority "clearly was holding this up."
In reaction to Vitter's message, Blanco called Bush at 2:20 p.m. to say she wanted a federal troop mobilization "today" and asked that someone communicate to her when the soldiers would arrive, according to Ryder's notes as he listened to the conversation. The governor specifically said she was not requesting federalization. There are no notes indicating Bush's response.
Suspicious of White House
Meanwhile, the White House, Pentagon and Department of Justice were weighing the legal options for various methods of placing federal troops in Louisiana. A senior Justice official said the agency provided legal consultation on federalizing the relief and law enforcement efforts late in the week.
On Sept. 1, three days after Katrina, U.S. District Attorney Jim Letten appeared at the state command center and spoke with Bottcher. While on the phone with the U.S. attorney general's office, Letten asked Bottcher for specifics about the troop deployments the governor wanted, Bottcher later said. Blanco officials interpreted this as further evidence the White House was bent on federalizing the relief operation.
Letten would not comment for this report.
Well into the evening, Ryder and other Blanco officials talked to military brass about the consequences of federalizing, with most officers advising the governor to maintain control over her Guard troops.
Among the most important recommendations was the one by Blum, the National Guard Bureau chief, who said the governor had nothing to gain by federalizing her Guard, according to Ryder's notes. Besides, massive numbers of Guard units now were flowing in quickly from other states, Blum pointed out.
By this time, Blanco officials and political strategists were conversing about the potential public relations consequences of the delayed federal response.
"By the weekend, the Bush administration will have a full-blown PR disaster/scandal on their hands because of the late response to needs in New Orleans," according to a Sept. 1 e-mail message sent by Blanco communications director Bob Mann. He attributed the observation to former President Clinton's press secretary Mike McCurry.
Kopplin advised the Blanco staff by e-mail that "we need to keep working to get our national surrogates to explain the facts." The chief of staff for Virginia's Democratic Gov. Mark Warner sent Kopplin an e-mail message with arguments and talking points against Guard federalization. And the communications director for the Democratic Governors Association sought to rally sympathetic governors with the message, "The states will help Louisiana, but where is the federal government?"
A furious Nagin
The morning of Sept. 2, Bush met with Blanco in New Orleans aboard Air Force One, and to some in attendance it appeared the denouement of the federal troops story had finally come. Instead, the meeting produced more controversy and no immediate decision.
Among those present were New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, both Louisiana senators, two congressmen, military officers and Bush Chief of Staff Andy Card.
Vitter and Nagin pressed for resolution on the troop deployments. At the mayor's urging, the president and governor moved to another section of the plane and talked privately for about a half hour, with Card present, according to interviews and reports from people there.
After the session with Blanco, the president invited Nagin into his office and told the mayor that he was "ready to move today" on the troop deployments and had offered two command options to Blanco, Nagin said. The mayor did not identify the options. However, the president said Blanco wanted 24 hours to make a decision, according to Nagin, who later roasted the governor in national TV interviews for the delay.
"It would have been great if we could have left Air Force One, walked outside, and told the world that we had this all worked out," Nagin told an interviewer. "It didn't happen, and more people died."
Some Blanco officials saw the Nagin critique as a veiled attack by the president.
"What have we done to counter Bush claim that gov delayed relief because she needed 24 hrs to make some decision?" reads an internal e-mail message by a Blanco administration official.
The governor's overview says that during the Air Force One meeting, the president asked Blanco to put her Guard troops under control of a general appointed by the Department of Defense, presumably Honore. In response, although she made the case to keep her adjutant general in charge, she didn't say no.
"Out of respect for the President, Gov. Blanco agrees that she would talk to Gen. Landreneau and her executive counsel and review the President's reorganization proposal," the overview says.
Blanco's internal documents would later call Bush's proposal a "paper reorganization." Still, according to Blanco's overview, she left Air Force One under the impression that Bush's anticipated order for federal troops in no way depended on the chain of command structure.
If she truly believed that, then it is no wonder her staff was so surprised by what happened around midnight.
'Rove is on the prowl'
More than any other event that week, the "midnight memo" dramatically elevated the Blanco team's sense of a political assault from Washington.
Drafted by the White House, a letter prepared for the governor's signature came across the fax machine at the state's Emergency Operations Center at 11:20 p.m. on Sept. 2, four and a half days after Katrina struck New Orleans.
At that time, the governor was awakened by calls from Card and Blum to discuss a new proposal. Her top staff spent the night poring over an attached draft memorandum of understanding, also prepared by the White House, that would have triggered the long-awaited deployment of regular Army troops to the region.
But Blanco aides were deeply suspicious.
"Please call my cell asap. Rove is on the prowl," Kopplin warns Mann in a 3:45 a.m. e-mail.
The agreement would have let President Bush place Honore over the entire hurricane response operation, including National Guard units in Louisiana overseen by the governor. But the offer had a twist: Honore would take a dual-hat command, meaning he would answer to Bush on matters related to the federal troops while answering to Blanco on matters related to the Guard.
If the commander encountered a conflict in orders between his two superiors, he would defer to his "federal mission" the president -- while judges deliberated over which order to follow.
"Mr. President, these actions are essential to ensure unity of effort and a fully coordinated state and Federal response to this extraordinary disaster," stated the draft letter.
Blanco aides were clearly alarmed that Blum had called to endorse the idea, because it seemed that after a visit to the White House he had changed his mind from earlier in the week.
In Ryder's notes from a phone call with Blum the next day, the National Guard chief told Ryder he was "under political duress" to endorse the midnight memo and was sorry about the late-night call.
"I apologize for an absolute goat screwing," Blum said, according to Ryder's notes.
A National Guard spokesman said Blum would not be available for comment until later this week.
Death amid inaction
Blanco's top aides said the memo was unexpected and unwanted, and the governor refused to sign it. Though the situation in New Orleans remained grim, crime and the evacuations had come under control, and the crisis had turned a corner. A Bush takeover at that point could have played a huge political trump card for the president.
The morning of Sept. 3, Blanco faxed back a letter of her own to the White House, making an innocuous point that it was OK with her if Bush put Honore in charge of federal forces, which was already the case.
At 8:56 a.m., Blanco called the White House and reached Card, who said the president was headed to the Rose Garden to announce the federal troop deployments. Under Bush's order that morning, Blanco and Landreneau would keep authority over the Guard, and the president and Honore would rule federal forces in the region.
It was the same point they had started with when Landreneau had called Honore four days earlier asking for help.
But by this time, many people had died, or had lived through frightful and inhumane conditions waiting to be rescued or bused out. By the end of the day, the Superdome and convention center would be evacuated.
By Monday, with nearly 20,000 National Guard members already in place, about 1,800 troops with the 82nd Airborne Division arrived in New Orleans. The Army eventually sent about 7,000. They were heartily welcomed and for several weeks until they left, they served an important role in the relief effort.